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RECENT CASES
ADJOINING LANDOWNERs-LATEiLAL

SUPPORT-WHERE WEIGHT OF BUILD-

ING DOES Nor CAUSE THE SuasIDrNcE-The plaintiff's buildings were injured

by a subsidence of his land caused by quicksand, which had been tapped by the
city's excavation for a sewer, running out from under the land. No negligence
was shown in the excavating. Held (one judge dissenting'), that the city was
liable for the injury done the buildings, for their weight did not contribute to the
subsidence. Prete et al. v. Cray, City Treasurer, 141 Atl. 6og (R. 1. 1928).'
The owner of land in its natural state has an absolute right to the support
of his soil by the neighboring land. An action for damages will lie, regardless
of negligence, if a subsidence of his soil is caused by an excavation on the adjoining land. But where the lateral pressure is increased by the weight of
buildings, and these buildings are damaged through a subsidence of the soil, no
action will lie for the injury done to the buildings or the soil unless the excavation was made in a negligent manner.' A difficult problem is presented when, as
in the principal case, buildings are injured through a subsidence of the soil, but
the weight of the buildings did not increase the lateral pressure. In allowing
recovery the case follows the English rule of lateral support,9 which rule has
been adopted in some jurisdictions in this country,' although, as the dissenting
judge points out, most of the cases cited by the court as authority for their
holding do not support it The other American jurisdictions in deciding, conI Rathbun, J., 141 Atl. at 613.
'It is interesting to notice that in Cabot v. Kingman, 166 Mass. 403, 407,
44 N. E. 344, 345 (1896), where the facts were similar, the dissenting opinion of
Holmes and two other justices would have denied recovery on the grounds that
"the withdrawal of the support . . . of soil to subterranean water is not
wrong, even if adjoining land subsides; Popplewell v. Hodkinso, L. R. 4 Ex.
?48 01869) ; and that the support of quicksand which flows so freely .
ought to follow that analogy. . . . They are inclined to regard the best distinction as that between the support of liquids and the support of solids."
' Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. igg (1877); Matulys v. The Philadelphia
and Reading Coal and Iron Co., 201 Pa. 70, 5o Atl. 823 (i9o2); I TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920)

§ 345;

WALSH, THE LAW OF PROPERTY (2d ed.

1927) § 298.
,'McGuire v. Grant, 25 N. J. L. 356 (1856) ; Matulys v. The Philadelphia
and Reading Coal and Iron Co., supra note 3; Spohm v. Dives, 174 Pa. 474,
34 Atl. 192 (1896) ; I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY; WALSH, THE LAW OF PROP-ERTY, both supra note 3.
'Brown v. Robins, 4 Hurl. & N. 186, 157 Reprint 8og (Eng. 1859) ; Stroyan
v. Knowles, 6 Hurl. & N. 454, 158 Reprint 186 (Eng. 1861).
'Wilms v. Jess, 94 Ill. 464 (188o); Busby v. Holthaus, 46 Mo. 161 (187o);
Riley v. Continuous Rail Joint Co., Iio App. Div. 787, 97 N. Y. Supp. 283
(iqo6), aff'd, 193 N. Y. 643, 86 N. E. 1132 (i9o6) ; Stearns v. Richmond, 88 Va.
992, 14 S. E. 847 (1892) ; see Beard v. Murphy, 37 Vt. 99 (1864).
7
Farnandis v. Great Northern Ry., 41 Wash. 486, 84 Pac. 18 (19o6), 5
L. R. A. (N. s.) io86 (907), was decided on a meaning of a clause in the state
constitution; Louisville & N. R. R. v. Bonhayo, 94 Ky. 67, 21 S. W. 526 (1893),
and Langhorne v. Turman, 141 Ky. 809, 133 S. W. 1OO8. 34 L. R. A. (N. s.)
(405)
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trary to the English rule, that even though the weight of the house does not add
to the subsidence there can be no recovery for injury to the buildings, base their
decisions on the reasoning that land with a building on it is not in its natural
state, making no distinction between the situation where the building caused the
subsidence by its weight and where the soil would have subsided even if the
building had not been there! The English rule is based on the theory that by
putting a house on his land the owner does not deprive himself of the common
law right to lateral support for his soil in its natural state; that if his neighbor's
excavation causes a subsidence of his soil, not added to by the weight of his
building, this right has been invaded; and that a direct consequence of this
wrongful invasion is injury to the building. Since a wrongdoer is liable for all
the direct consequences of his wrongful act, the excavator must pay damages for
the injury done to the soil and the buildingY Because it is difficult to prove
whether or not the soil would have subsided if the building had not been there,
and also, under one view, to separate the injury done to the soil from that done
to the building, both rules have been criticised and the suggestion made that even
recovery for injury done to the soil should be refused where there is a building
on the land, regardless of whether or not its weight affected the subsidence
However, since our rules of law should be governed by logic and justice, and
not by the ease or difficulty of proof, the English rule should prevail.

FoRuia AS GOVERNING LIAEnglish steamship collided
with a Brazilian steamship in Belgian waters. The English owner brought a
libel against the Brazilian owner in a United States court, having attached one of
the respondent's vessels in the district. In defense, the respondent sought to limit
the extent of the damages under a Belgian statute. Held, that the law of the
forum should apply. Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. v. Companhia de Navegacao
Lloyd Brasileiro,27 F. (2d) OO2 (E. D. N. Y. 1928).
An appropriate court of the United States may in its discretion take jurisdiction of suits arising from collisions on the high seas,' or in the territorial
ADMIRALTY-CONFLICT OF LAWS-LAw OF THE
COLLISION IN FOREIGN WATErs-An

BILITY FOR A

211, are both blasting cases, the former decision being based on the improper
methods used, and the latter being a direct trespass; Gobeille v. Meunier, 21
R. I. 103, 41 Atl. lOOi (1898), was a case of actual digging on the plaintiff's
land; and the point decided in the principal case was mere dicta in Booth v.
Rome, etc., R. R., 140 N. Y. 267, 35 N. E. 592 (1893) ; Beard v. Murphy, supra
note 6.
'Jamison v. Myrtle Lodge, r58 Iowa 264, 139 N. W. 547 (1913); Gilmore

v. Driscoll, supra note 3; Cooper v. Altoona Concrete Constr., etc., Co.,

231

Pa.

557, 8o Atl. 1047 (1911); see Gildersleeve v. Hammond, log Mich. 431, 67

N. W. 519 (1896); I TIFFANY,
both supra note 3.

ERTY,9

REAL PROPERTY; WALSH, THE LAW OF PaoP-

Supra notes 5 and 6.

" Lessman, Significance of the Doctrine of Lateral Support as a Real Property Right (1921) I6 ILL. L. REv. 1O8, 113.
'The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 355, 5 Sup. Ct. 86o (1885).
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waters of a foreign nation But having rightfully acquired jurisdiction, shall
the United States court apply its own law or the law of the nation in whose
waters the collision occurred? In the ordinary situation of a tort committed on
land, the lex loci delicti applies when suit is brought in the courts of another
nation,8 unless against the policy of the law of the forum.' Maritime torts and
collisions are governed by the same rule in determining whether or not a tort
has been committed.' However, after liability has been established by the lex
loci, the limitation of that liability presents a different problem.' A nation may
properly control the use of its territorial waters by enacting navigation and
pilotage rules, the violation of which creates a tort obligation,7 but such nation
cannot claim exclusive jurisdiction to limit the liability of a foreign shipowner
who is sued in another forum! Statutory limitation of a shipowner's liability
aims to encourage investments in shipping,' and the court in which suit is brought
may apply either the statute of. the forum or the statute of the place of collision, as its local policy dictates." Thus in cases of collision on the high seas
between vessels of foreign ownership, an American court will, in order to limit
liability, apply the statutes of the United States' which follow the general
maritime law." The theory behind these decisions is that the obligation may
be created by the law of a foreign nation, but the law of the forum may refuse
to enforce or may limit that obligation whenever it is opposed to domestic
'Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, 175 Fed. 215 (S. D. N. Y. io9) ; The Diana,
In The Thorgerd, ii F. (2d) 971 (E. D. N. Y.
1926) the court refused to take jurisdiction because both parties were of the
same foreign nation.
I Lush. 539 (Adm. 1862).

'Cuba Railroad Co. v. Crosby, 222 U. S. 473, 32 Sup. Ct. 132 (1912);
Slater v. Mexican National Railway Co., 194 U. S. 120, 24 Sup. Ct. 58I (904) ;
Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 190, 14 Sup. Ct. 978 (1894) ;

Turner v. St. Clair Tunnel Co., 121 Mich. 616, 8o N. W. 720 (1899) ; Beacham
v. Proprietors, 68 N. H. 382, 40 Atl. io66 (1895).
'May v. Smith, 32 N. B. 474 (1894) ; see The Branford City, 29 Fed. 373,
395 (1886).
I Smith v. Condry, I How. 28 (U. S. 1843) ; The New York, 175 U. S. 187,
20 Sup. Ct. 67 (1899); The Calvin Austin, 9 Exch. Ct. 16o (New Brunswick
Adm. Dist. 1904). Contra: La Bourgogne, 21o U. S. 95, 28 Sup. Ct. 664
(19o8); The M. Moxham, L. R. I P. & D. 43 (1875). The earlier law accepted the fiction that a ship on the high seas was part of the territory designated by its flag. See The Scotia, 14 Wall. 170, 184 (U. S. 1871).
' See Cuba Railroad Co. v. Crosby, 222 U. S. 473, 478 (1912).
7 Smith v. Condry; The New York; The Calvin Austin, all supra note 5.
' (1924)

33 YALE LAW JOURNAL 867, 869.
'See Norwich Co. v. Wright, 13 Wall. 104, 123 (U. S. 1871) ; Providence
& N. Y. Steamship Co. v. Hill, 109 U. S. 578, 58 8, 3 Sup. Ct. 379, 386 (1883).
'0JEssup,

LAW

OF TERRITORIAL

WATERS

AND

MARITIME JURISDICTION

(1927) 143.
'Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Mellor, 233 U. S. 718, 34 Sup. Ct. 754
(1914) ; La Bourgogne, supra note 5; The Scotland, lO5 U. S. 24 (1881) ; Norwich v. Wright, supra note 9; The Norge, 156 Fed. 845 (S. D. N. Y. 19o7);
The Strathdon, 89 Fed. 374 (E. D. N. Y. 1898) ; RoscoE, ADmIRALTY PRACTICE
( 4 th ed. 1920) 113; WESTLAKCE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed.
1925) 289.

'See

La Bourgogne, supra note 5, at 116; The Scotland, supra note II, at

29; Norwich v. Wright, supra note 9, at 127.
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policy.' This principle may readily be extended to collisions within the terriIn the principal case, the libellant having
torial waters of a foreign state'
availed himself of his right to choose a forum the respondent seeks to invoke
a Belgian statute which limits his liability. The application of this statute will
materially impair the rights of the libellant because the statute has not been
revised to meet post-war depreciation in Belgian currency. Inasmuch as courts
of admiralty act on equitable principles," and since the law of the nation of
neither litigant has been pleaded, the court in the principal case properly applied
the law of the forum in the exercise of its discretion. This is in accord with
the growing tendency to depart from the strict territorial theory of conflict of
laws when the application of that theory contravenes public policy 7

ADMIRALTY-MARITIME LINS-WAv'ER BY RECEmNG TRADE ACCEPTANCES

-The libelant coal company supplied coal for the claimant's domestic ship, and
received trade acceptances in return. The libelant now attempts to recover the
balance due on the unpaid acceptances under a maritime lien provided by the
Merchant Marine Act. Held (one judge dissenting), that the receipt of the
trade acceptances constituted a waiver of the lien. The President Arthur, 25
F. (2d) 648 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).2

Under maritime law the furnishing of necessities to a foreign ship at the
request of the master prima facie established a lien in the supplier,' while the
" See Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Mellor, supra note I,

at 732.

U. S. statute does not limit the libellant's right, but merely limits his remedy.
Ibid., at 733.
" Owners of S. S. Reresby v. Owners of S. S. Cobetas, Scots L. T. 719
(Outer House 1923).

Chubb v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 39 Fed. 431 (E. D. N. Y.
1889).
0'Brien v. Miller, 168 U. S. 287, 18 Sup. Ct. 140 (1911) ; Toledo Co. v.
Zenith, 184 Fed. 391 (C. C. A. 6th, i9ii); National Oil Transport Co. v. United
States, 18 F. (2d) 305 (E. D. La. 1927); The Red Lion, 22 F. (2d) 329 (E. D.

N. Y. 1927).
7

See Guiness v. Miller,
746.

291

Fed. 769, 770 (S. D. N. Y. 1923) ;

(1924)

33

YALE LAW JOURNAL

141 STAT. 988, 30 (P) (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 971 (1926) : "Any person furnishing repairs, (or) supplies . . . to any vessel, whether foreign or domestic,

upon the order of the owner of such vessel, or person authorized by the owner,
shall have a maritime lien on the vessel, . . . and it shall not be necessary to
allege or prove that credit was given to the vessel." A later subsection provides that "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent the furnisher
of repairs, (or) supplies . . . from waiving his right to a lien
agreement or otherwise." Ibid. (S), 46 U. S. C. § 974.

. . . by

Both the deciding and dissenting opinions discussed "payment" before taking up "waiver." Due to the necessarily limited space of this comment, the
discussion will be confined to the latter topic.
'Zane v. The President, Fed. Cas. No. 18,2Ol (C. C. Pa. 1824) ; The Sea
Lark, Fed. Cas. No. 12,579 (D. C. Mass. 186o). For discussion of early admiralty lien law see Fitz-Henry Smith, Jr., The Confusion in the Law Relating to
Materialbnens Liens on Vessels, (1908) 21 HAxv. L. REv. 332; HUGHES, ADMIRALTY (2d. ed. 192o) § 45.

RECENT CASES
supplying of a domestic' ship at the request of either master or owner, or of a
foreign ship at the request of the owner,' raised the presumption that only the
personal credit of the owner was relied upon, and the lien did not attach.
Either of these presumptions was rebuttable, but the burden of proof was on
the party seeking to overthrow them.' The Merchant Marine Act, however,
prima facie establishes a lien in all cases, whether the ship be foreign or domestic, and whether the goods be supplied at the request of master or owner. But
although it provides that the lien may be waived, it is silent as to burden of
proof. Therefore the common law rule that the burden is on the party setting
up waiver' must apply. To prove waiver it is necessary to show that by the
language or conduct of a party it was his intention to relinquish a right.? The
cases have generally held that the taking of a bill of exchange, note or trade
acceptance is of itself not sufficient to prove such an intention." However, the
taking of such instrument, if accompanied by other circumstances,' may be
inconsistent with the lien attaching or continuing; also, of course, there may be
an express waiver by the supplier." In the principal case there are neither
additional circumstances nor an express waiver. Therefore the general rule"
should apply, %iz., that the bare taking of acceptances shows not an intention to
waive the lien, but merely to obtain additional security. It is true that before
the Act, since the claimant's ship was a domestic one, the supplier would have
'The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558 (U. S. 1874); Davis v. New Brig, Fed.
Cas. No. 3,643 (D. C. Pa. 1834).
'The St. Jago de Cuba, 9 Wheat. 409 (U. S. 1824).
'The Emily Souder, 17 Wall. 667 (U. S. 1873); The Prospect, Fed. Cas.
No. 11,443 (C. C. N. Y. 1856); Gulf City Coal & Wood Co. v. Bru, 68 Fed.
926 (C. C. A. Sth, z895).

'Supra note i.

'Aronson v. Frankfort Ins. Co., 9 Cal. App. 473, 99 Pac. 537 (i9o8) ; Rosen
v. German Alliance Ins. Co., io6 Me. 229, 76 At. 688 (i9o9); Bergeron v.
Pamlico Ins. Co., iii N. C. 45, i5 S. E. 883 (892).
'Fairbanks v. Baskett, 98 Mo. App. 53, 64, 71 S. W. 1113, 1116 (x903);
Davis v. Fenner, 3o Pa. Super. 389, 392 (i9o6).
"The St. Lawrence, i Black 522 (U. S. 1861); The John C. Fisher, 50
Fed. 703 (C. C. A. 3d, 1892); The Crescent, 88 Fed. 298 (D. C. N. J. i898);

HUGHES, op. cit. supra note 3, at io5. Contra: Davenport v. The Sea Flower,
Fed. Cas. No. 3,589 (S. D. N. Y. 1847). Similarly, the taking of a mortgage
on the vessel was held not to waive the lien. The Queen of St. Johns, 3r Fed.
24 (C. C. N. D. Fla. z886). Contra: The Yankton, 7 F. (2d) 384 (D. C.
Mass. 1925). Likewise where a bond was taken. El Amigo, 285 Fed. 868
(C. C. A. 5th, 1923). So also, where the supplier reserved title in the res
supplied. The Pearl, z89 Fed. 540 (D. C. N. C. 1911). In contrast, the taking
of a bottomry bond was held to waive the lien. The Ann C. Pratt, Fed. Cas.
No. 409 (C. C. Me. 1853), aff'd sub norn. Carrington v. The Ann C. Pratt, i8
How. 63 (U. S. i855).
'The Kearsarge, Fed. Cas. No. 7,634 (D. C. Me. i855). If a lien given
by statute likewise expires at a definite time by statutory provision, and notes
are taken payable after that time, such is a waiver of the lien. Peyroux v.
Howard, 7 Pet. 324 (U. S. 1833); The Nebraska, 69 Fed. loO9 (C. C. A.
7th, i895).
The Half Moon, 46 Fed. 812 (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 189i).
"Supra note io.
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had to prove that the parties intended a lien to attach. 4 But the statute, prima
facie establishing a lien in all cases, in effect has shifted the burden of proof to
the claimant, who should have to prove the waiver of the lien.' It is submitted
that the court erred in failing to recognize this effect of the statute, and in
holding the mere taking of acceptances, without proof of additional circumstances by the claimant, to constitute a waiver of the lien.
LIABILITY OF LESSOR OF AUTOMOAUTOMOBILES-CONTRACTS-STATUTORY
BrLES-The plaintiff was injured in Massachusetts due to the concurrent negligence of the drivers of two cars, one of which had been rented in Connecticut
from the defendant company. A Connecticut statute' broadly imposes on the
lessors of cars liability for all damage done by the car while so rented. Held,
that the plaintiff can recover in Connecticut from the lessor of the car. Levy v.
Daniels U-Drive Co. et al., 143 At. 163 (Conn. 1928).
This action being brought for recovery for a tort committed in Massachusetts, it would appear that, under principles of conflicts, the law of Massachusetts should control and that, Massachusetts having no statute imposing liability
on the lessors of cars, the plaintiff should not recover. The theory of the court,
however, was to the effect that the action was essentially one of contract and
not one of tort. They arrived at this conclusion by reasoning that the Connecticut statute imposed, as a condition of every contract for the hiring of cars,
a liability on the lessor, that this condition was imposed solely for the benefit
of the class of which the plaintiff was one, and that he, therefore, could sue as
a third party beneficiary of the contract. This exact question does not seem to
have arisen before. There is no common-law liability on the owner, per se, for
the negligence of one who has hired his car. Many states have enacted statutes
imposing a general liability on the owners of automobiles' but the liability has
not been founded on any contract between the owner and the driver, and the
courts have therefore very properly construed the obligation to be one of tort.'
In the principal case, however, the defendant voluntarily assumed the liability
"Supra note 4.
'The Fairhope, 235 Fed. 1007 (D. C. La. 1916). Most courts do not lay
this down as a rule, but their decisions seem to be to that effect. Ricou v.
Fairbanks, ii F. (2d) 103 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926) ; The E 270, 16 F. (2d) ioo5

(D. C. Mass. 1927).
PUB. ACTS 1925, c. 195 § 21.
'White v. Holmes, 89 Fla. 251, 1O3 So. 623
'CONN.

(1925);

Newbrand v. Kraft,

169 Iowa 444, 151 N. W. 455 (1915) ; Phillips v. Gookin, 231 Mass. 250, 120

N. E. 691 (1918); see Doersam v. Isenburg, 205 App. Div. 447, i99 N. Y.
Supp. 569 (923).
'MicH. CoMP. STAT. (Cahill, 1915) 4825; IOWA CODE (1924) §5o26;
N. Y. SEss. LAWS (1926) 136o, c. 73o. A prior Mich. statute (PuB. ACTS 19o9,
No. 318) was declared unconstitutional for imposing too broad a liability on the
owner. Daugherty v. Thomas, 174 Mich. 371, 14o N. W. 615 (1913); Barry v.
Metzger, 175 Mich. 466, 141 N. W. 529 (913).

' This point seems to have been admitted, as the actions brought under
these statutes sounded in tort. See Seleine v. Wisner, 200 Iowa 1389, 2o6 N. W.
130 (1925); Stapleton v. Independent Brewing Co., 198 Mich. 170, 164 N. W.
520 (1917); Stapleton v. Hertz Drivurself Sta., Inc., 129 Misc. 772, 222 N. Y.
Supp. 579 (1927), rev'd 131 Misc. Rep. 52, 225 N. Y. Supp. 66i (1928).
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by making the contract. The law of Connecticut allows a third party beneficiary to recover on a contract.Y It is not necessary that his identity be determined at the time the contract is made,' nor is it necessary that every clause of
the contract be for the sole benefit of the third party.' It is therefore submitted
that the reasoning of the court on this point is sound. The law of Massachusetts is not contravened in any way. The plaintiff may still prosecute judgments
against the negligent parties in Massachusetts.
The familiar principle, that he
may have only one satisfaction,' should apply, however, even though one action
is in tort and the other is held to sound in contract. Another apparent difficulty,
however, stands in the way of the court's decision. The driver of the other
car, against whom the action was solely one of tort, was made a joint defendant
with the U-Drive Co., against which the action was held to be one of contract.
Under a statute"0 this would seem to be a material procedural error, but the
question was not raised by the court although the case came to them on demurrer. The principal case seems to be another excellent illustration of the
application of old principles to a new situation, in an effort to solve a modern
problem.
BILLS AND NOTES-MISTAKE AS TO LEGAL STATUS OF PAYEE-LABLMTY

oF

BANK GUARANTEEING PRIOR INDORSEENTs-The government issued allowance
checks to a woman designated by a soldier as his wife, but who in fact was not
his wife. The checks were indorsed by the woman and by the defendant bank,
the latter guaranteeing all prior indorsements. The government sued the bank
on this guaranty, on the ground that the payee was not the soldier's wife.
Held, that there could be no recovery. United States v. Liberty Ins. Bank, 26
F. (2d) 493 (W. D. Ky. 1928).
Who is the payee is a question of intent, and, while there has been considerable difference of opinion, the better view now seems to be that it is the objective
intent which controls.1 There is perhaps no question that has been raised in so
'Bauer v. Devenis, 99 Conn. 203, 121 At. 566 (1923) ; Tuttle v. Jockmus,
lo6 Conn. 683, 138 AtI. 8o4 (1927).
'Whitehead v. Burgess, 61 N. J. L. 75, 38 Atl. 8o2 (1897).
" WrLLiSTON, CONTRACTS (924)

§ 357.

'Rogers v. Ponet, 21 Cal. App. 577, 132 Pac. 851 (1913); Chicago G. W.
R. Co. v. Hulbert, 205 Fed. 248 (1913).
'Neugent v. Boston Cons. Gas Co., 238 Mass. 221, 13o N. E. 488 (I92I);
Sessions v. Johnson, 95 U. S. 347 (1877).
10 CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) § 5636: "•
. .; but where several causes of
action are united in the same complaint they must all be brought to recover
either . . . or (7) upon claims whether in contract or tort or both, arising
out of the same transaction or transactions connected with the same subject of
action. The several causes of action so united . . . must affect all the parties to the action . . ." In Miner v. McNamara, 82 Conn. 578, 58o, 74 Atl.
933, 934 (igog), the court said that under this statute an action sounding in tort
against two defendants could not be joined with an action founded on a contract
against a third defendant.
'U. S. v. National Ex. Bank, 45 Fed. 163 (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1891) ; Emporia Nat. Bank v. Shotwell, 35 Kan. 36o, ii Pac. 141 (1886); Hartford v.
Greenwich Bank, 157 App. Div. 448, 142 N. Y. Supp. 387 (1913); Land T. & T.
Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 196 Pa. 230, 46 Atl. 42o (19oo).
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many branches of the law as has the question involved in this case. It is a
familiar principle of criminal law that if A desires to kill B, and shoots C, mistaking him for B, he is guilty of an assault with intent to kill C. The same

principle has often been followed in the law of sales," and in the law governing
the liability of carriers.' An apt expression of the rule was given by the Court

5
of Appeals of New York, in Phelps v. McQuade: "Where the vendor of personal property intends to sell his goods to the person with whom he deals, then

title passes, even though he be deceived as to that person's identity or responsibility . . . It is purely a question of the vendor's intention." The question
has frequently arisen in the law of negotiable instruments, in determining whether
the drawee bank can properly charge to the account of the drawer payments

made when the payee of the instrument is an impostor. The majority of the
courts have held that the bank can so charge these payments,' thereby holding

that the impostor is the real payee.

True, some courts have refused to apply

the rule when the transaction is conducted by mail," although it is difficult to
8
Three possible situations may
perceive why such a distinction should be made
exist in these cases: (i) where the impostor is present, and the drawer intends

to deal with the person before him; (2) where the impostor is absent, but the
drawer intends to deal with him as a particular entity; (3) where the impostor
is absent, but the drawer, because of prior transactions, intends to deal with a
different entity, represented in his mind by the name used by the impostor. It
2 People v. Torres, 38 Cal. 141 (1869); McGehee v. State, 62 Miss. 772

(885)

; cf. State v. Gallagher, 83 N. J. L. 32i, 85 Atl. 207 (1912) ; Note (I919)
68 U. OF PA. L. REv. 387.
'Perkins & Gray v. Anderson, 65 Iowa 398, 21 N. W. 696 (884) ; Phelps
v. McQuade, 22o N. Y. 232, 115 N. E. 44i (917) ; Phillips v. Brooks, [i919]
2 K. B. 243; WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 635.
'The Drew, 15 Fed. 826 (S. D. N. Y. 1883) ; Edmunds v. Merchants Transportation Co., 135 Mass. 283 (883) ; Singer v. Merchants D. T. Co., i9i Mass.
449, 77 N. E. 882 (19o6) ; Fox River Co. v. Lightning Motor Line, 125 Misc.
i16, 21o N. Y. Supp. 172 (1925) ; M'Kean v. M'Ivor, L. R. 6 Ex. 36 (i87o).
' Supra note 3, at 234.
'Emporia Nat. Bank v. Shotwell, supra note I, at 367, I1 Pac. at 149:
"Shotwell intended the draft to be sent to the party executing the notes and
mortgage, and intended it to be paid to the person to whom he sent it . .
and therefore the National Bank is protected in paying the draft to the very
person whom Shotwell intended to designate by the name of Daniel Guernesy."
Land T. & T. Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Bank; United States v. National Exch.
Bank, both supra note i. Hoffman v. American Exch. Nat. Bank, 96 N. W.
112 (Neb. 1901) ; 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1597, n. 94. Contra:
Loeffel v. Pohlman, 47 Mo. App. 574 (1892); Tolman v. American Nat. Bank,
(decided under § 23 of the NEGOTIALE INSTRu22 R. I. 462, 48 At!. 480 (19o)
MENTS LAW).
7

Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Silverman, 148 App. Div. 1, 132 N. Y. Supp.
aff'd 21o N. Y. 567, 104 N. E. 1134 (1914); Phelps v. McQuade,
supra note 3; WLisT N, op. cit. supra note 3, § 635.
'Many courts have not drawn any distinction and this seems to be the better
opinion. Boatsman v. Stockmen's Nat. Bank, 56 Colo. 495, 138 Pac. 764 (914) ;
Uriola v. Twin Falls B. & T. Co., 37 Idaho 332, 215 Pac. io8o (1923) ; Emporia
Nat. Bank v. Shotwell, supra note I; BIGELow, BILus, NOrEs, AND CHECKS (3d
ed. 1928) 1O2, n. I; Ashley, Mutual Assent in Contract (1903) 3 COL. L. Rv.
.,
71, 75.
1017 (1911),

RECENT CASES
is submitted that only in the third situation should a distinction be made, and
consideration be given to the subjective intent of the drawer? The court in the
instant case said that the woman was the payee intended by the drawer, and the
bank only guaranteed that the indorsement was in her writing. This decision
seems eminently justified. She was the person whom the drawer intended should
be paid' and the sole mistake was that of the drawer as to her legal status.
To place liability on the defendant would not only seem to be a perversion of the
law relative to the liability of indorsers, but would work a glaring injustice.

CONFLIcT OF LAws-JurIsDIcTIoN

TO GRANT A

DivocE-The defendant,

married in New York, left her husband without legal justification. The husband established a residence and obtained a decree of divorce from the defendant
in Ohio after service by publication. The plaintiff and defendant thereafter
married in New York. Plaintiff brought an action to annul his marriage with
defendant on the ground that the divorce obtained by first husband was void.
Held, that the Ohio divorce was valid. Richards v. Richards, 132 Misc. 551
(N. Y. 1928).
The question whether a foreign divorce secured after constructive service
on defendant is valid in New York has long been disputed by the courts of that
state.' They had always subscribed to the fundamental dogma of the conflict of
laws that domicil determines the divorce jurisdiction? The fact that a divorce
action is most properly considered as one in rein,' and that the decree acts upon
the marriage status (which is the res) to its destruction, and consequently that
it is a condition precedent to effective jurisdiction that the res be before the
court,' did not disturb them. To dispense with personal service the 'doctrine of
matrimonial domicil,' i. e., that the state where the parties had last lived together,
is to be considered as such a domicil, was evolved by them. Aided by this
'In Meridian Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 7 Ind. App. 322, 329 (1893),
the court said: ". . . it is the identity of the person, and not of the name,
which controls." Cf. Robertson v. Coleman, 141 Mass. 231, 232, 4 N. E. 619,
620 (i886).
"0In Hartford v. Greenwich Bank, supra note I, at 451, 142 N. Y. Supp.
at 389, the court said of a similar situation: "it (the drawer) intended when
it uttered the check that it should be paid to the person from whom, as it then
believed, it had made the purchase. That person was the identical person to
whom the checks were paid . . . There was an actual person, calling himself
James Wilson . . . and it was that person to whom the tea company intended
its checks should be paid." Cf. Crippen v. American Nat. Bank, 51 Mo. App.
5o8 (1892) ; Land T. & T. Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, supra note I.
'Atherton v. Atherton, 18i U. S. 155 (igoi); Haddock v. Haddock, 2o1
U. S. 562 (i9o6); People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78 (i879); O'Dea v. O'Dea, ioi
N. Y. 23, 4 N. E. nio (1885); DeMele v. DeMele, 2O N. Y. 485, 24 N. E. 996
(i8go).
'BisnoP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION (i8gi) §.42; Bell v. Cross,
231 N. Y. 329, 132 N. E. io6 (121) ; Knill v. Knill, iig Misc. 186, 195 N. Y.
Supp. 398 (1922).
MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1901) § 87.
'Ibid, §§ 88, 92.
'Licht v. Licht, 88 Misc. io7, iSO N. Y. Supp. 643 (1914).
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doctrine they held that if parties had separate domiciles in different states, the
marriage status (the res), being intangible, was in the innocent party in the state
of the matrimonial domicil. That court therefore having jurisdiction of the
res might render a decree after service by publication,' which would be entitled
to full faith and credit under the constitution.' This reasoning is based on the
theory that since the absent party is unjustifiably wrong, that party cannot
take along the marital status, which must remain with the innocent party in the
domicil of matrimony, thereby giving to the courts of that state jurisdiction to
render a decree without personal service.8 In the principal case the court, applying the legal fiction' that the wife's domicil follows her husband when she in
fact refuses to go with him, held that when the first husband settled in Ohio it
became his permanent domicil as well as the constructive domicil of his wife,
and therefore the matrimonial domicil of defendant and her husband. Having
jurisdiction of the marital res, the divorce granted therefore would be valid.
It is advanced that even conceding the 'doctrine of matrimonial domicil' to be
correct," the courts should not place by construction such a domicil in any
state when the fundamental basis for the doctrine, i. e., the living together of
the parties in that state, is lacking.
CRIMES-CONSPIRACY IN

RELATION

TO THE DOCTRINE OF MERGER-After

complaint on a charge of conspiracy to defraud, the defendant was indicted for
grand larceny in that by the false representations set out in the conspiracy
charge he stole a sum of money. This is a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the conspiracy charge on the ground that the conspiracy merged in the charge
of grand larceny. Held, that the "doctrine of merger" is no longer recognized
in New York. People v. Palnisano,132 Misc. 243 (N. Y. 1928).
It was a principle of the English law, and the rule has been adopted in some
of our states, that there can be no conviction for a misdemeanor upon proof of
a felony or upon an indictment for a felony, even though the allegations of the
indictment included such misdemeanor.' This so-called "doctrine of merger"
applied only where the same criminal act constituted both offenses' and there
was an identity of time, place and circumstances.' In modern times, although
the procedural reason for the rule has disappeared,4 courts have, nevertheless,
' Schenker v. Schenker, 228 N. Y. 6oo, 127 N. E. 921 (i918); Sorenson
v. Sorenson, 122 Misc. 196, 202 N. Y. Supp. 620 (1924).
'Art. IV, Sec. I.

(1927) 33 W. VA. L. Q. 139.
(i926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 738.
'0

Gould v. Gould, 235 N. Y. 14, 138 N. E. 490 (1923)

(legal domicil is not

essential to jurisdiction for divorce and the appearances of the parties alone is
sufficient).
ICom. v. Kingsbury, 5 Mass. io6 (18o9) ; see Com. v. Parr, 5 Watts and S.
345, 347 (Pa. 1843).
I Cf. Boone v. State, 121 Ga. 147, 48 S. E. 986 (19o4).
3
Regent v. People, 96 Ill. App. 189 (19oi).

'Originally the doctrine was only supported on the reason (and accurately
so) that persons indicted for a misdemeanor had certain advantages at the trial,
such as the right to make a full defense by counsel, to have a copy of the indict-
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followed the doctrine on the theory that the offense merged is less than the one
in which it is merged, and that the ingredients of the smaller are so identical
with the ingredients of the larger that when both have been committed they
cannot in reason and justice be separated,5 so that to punish an accused in such
a case for both offenses would be in effect to punish the same act twice.' The
majority of courts, however, have been reluctant to split hairs in favor of those
charged with serious crime, and the very tribunals that once proclaimed the
theory have long since abandoned it 7 The court in the principal case, in considering the problem as to whether a conspiracy merged into the completed
crime, in terms of the "doctrine of merger," has failed to distinguish the essential differences which exist between the legal conception of a conspiracy to
commit a felony and an assault with intent to commit it, in their relation to the
completed crime. Combinations against law are always dangerous to public
peace and private security. Courts have, therefore, seen fit to punish the unlawful confederacy in order to prevent the doing of any act in the execution of it.
The conspiracy is a crime of itself, and its acts are in no sense a necessary element of the felony planned or included in it,' so that an indictment for the latter
cannot be said to include the punishable acts of the former. On the other hand.
in a felony involving force, such as robbery, the allegation of the completed
crime includes along the iter criminis an assault accompanied by the intent to
rob." The act in the assault is part and parcel of the act in the robbery itself.
In such a case, only, should it be proper to raise the query as to whether an
indictment for the completed crime includes the lesser crimes and whether the
misdemeanor, assault with intent to rob, should not in fact be merged with the
greater crime, the felony." Although the result sought by the principal case is
ment, and to have a special jury-privileges not accorded to a person indicted
for a felony. CLARK, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1918) 413. The reason for
the rule has, of course, ceased to exist.
'The doctrine does not apply where both offenses are considered either
felonies or misdemeanors. WHARTON, CmanIii.. LAw (ioth ed. i896) § 272.
' State v. Setter, 57 Conn. 461, 18 At. 782 (1889); cf. Geist v. United
States, 26 App. D. C. 594 (I9o6).
7
Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131 (1912); People v. Sumarski, 210
Ill. App. 233 (i919) ; People v. Robertson, 284 I1. 62o, 12o N. E. 539 (i18) ;
Commonwealth v. Walker, io8 Mass. 3o9 (871 ) ; Commonwealth v. Corcoran,
78 Pa. Super. 430 (1922) ; Regina v. Button, II Q. B. 929 (1848).
8Commonwealth v. Judd, 2 Mass. 329 (1807).
' In like manner, since the allegation of non-success, under the ordinary
rules of criminal pleading, is essential to an indictment for attempt, it is plain
that an attempt is not included within the allegations stating the consummated
crime. People v. Lardner, 300 Ill. 264, 133 N. E. 375 (192i). Contra: "In
'every actual rape, there is necessarily involved an attempt to commit the crime."
Lewis v. State, 3o Ala. 54 (1857) (evidently confusing legal use of term
"attempt" with ordinary use). Some states by statute have allowed conviction
for attempt, where the evidence shows the completed crime, e. g., NFw YORK
ANN. CONS. LAWS (Cum. Supp. i918-20) 5633. In some states, because of
statute, also, where a person is charged with the actual commission of a crime,
and the evidence shows that he was guilty only of an attempt to commit it, he
may be convicted of the attempt. It re Lloyd, 5I Kans. 501, 33 Pac. 3o7
(1893) ; State v. Frank, 103 MO. 120, 15 S.W. 330 (i89o).
370, 133 N. E. 767 (I921).
Cf. People v. Mason, 301 Ill.
CLnAR, op. cit. supra note 4, at 412. Also see supra note 5.
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probably desirable, the method of reasoning serves not only to modify a mere
arbitrary rule of law but the juristic conception of conspiracy itself. In the
interest of simplicity and accuracy of judicial reasoning, the basis for the decision must, necessarily, be frowned upon.
EVIDENCE-RELATIVE

WEIGHT

OF

POSITIVE AND

NEGATIVE

TESTIMONY-

INSTRUCTIONS TO JuRY-Plaintiff brought action to recover for injuries received

when the car in which he was riding was struck by defendant's train. Plaintiff
introduced two witnesses who testified that they heard neither the train nor the
signal bell until after the crash. Defendant introduced six witnesses, including
the train crew and one passenger, who testified that the signals were given.
Held, inter alia, that evidence given by plaintiff's witnesses was not sufficient in
law to support a verdict for the plaintiff. White v. Southern Ry. Co., 144 S. E.
424 (Va. 1928).
As a general proposition, it seems well settled that the positive testimony of
one credible witness to a fact is entitled to more weight than that of several
other equally credible witnesses who testify negatively, or to circumstances
merely persuasive in their character from which a negative will be inferred.'
A distinction, however, must be made between the testimony of a witness who
does not deny a fact, but merely states that he did not know of, or has no recollection of an event, and testimony of a witness that he was giving attention to
the circumstances, and that no such event took place. The former is negative
testimony proper;' while the latter is considered positive testimony as to the
non-occurrence of the fact, though it is sometimes termed "quasi-negative" testimony.3 There is no weakness in evidence of the latter type, and it is entitled to
as much value as purely affirmative testimony.' On the question of whether the
court may instruct the jury as to the relative probative value of positive and
negative evidence, there seems to be a conflict of authority; but the cases show
that this is the result of the conflict as to the power of the court to charge on
matters of fact, or to comment on the evidence. The majority of jurisdictions
362
'Rhodes v. United States, 79 Fed. 74o (1897) ; Frizell v. Cole, 42 Ill.
(1866) ; Hinton v. Cream City R. R. Co., 65 Wis. 323, 27 N. W. 147 (1886) ;
3 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (16th ed. 1899) §375; 1 BLASHEFIELD'S INSTRUCTIONS
TO JURIES (2d ed. 1916) §337; 1 RANDALL'S INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES (1922)

§ 57.

"Negative evidence relates only to evidence of a witness who had an opportunity to see an occurrence testified to by some other witness as having occurred,
that he did not see it, or of one who had opportunity to hear or know of an
occurrence, testified positively by some other witness to h.ve happened, that he
did not hear it or recollect it." Marshall, J., in Anderson v. Horlick's Malted
Milk Co., 137 Wis. 569, i19 N. W. 342 (1909).

499, 46 N. E. 373
'West Chicago Street R. R. Co. v. Mueller, 165 Ill.
(1897) ; Smith v. Milwaukee Builders' & Traders' Exchange, 91 Wis. 360, 64
N. W. iooi (1895) ; Frizell v. Cole, supra note I, at 364.
'Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Stepp et aL, 164 Fed. 785 (C. C. A. 8th,
19o8); Daniels v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co., 183 Mass.
393, 67 N. E. 424 (19o3); Slattery v. New York, New Haven and Hartford
R. R. Co., 203 Mass. 453, 89 N. E. 622 (igo9) ; Gibson v. Bessemer & L. E.
R. R. Co., 226 Pa. 198, 75 At. 194 (19o8) ; see (i909) 8 MicE. L. REV. 338,
and (1923) 22 MICH. L. REV. 268.
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in the United States seem to have abrogated the common law rule 5 permitting
comment on evidence by the court, and now, under constitutional or statutory
provisions, many courts are prohibited from charging the jury as to matters of
fact.' In such jurisdictions, courts may not charge as to the relative weight of
positive and purely negative testimony, and such instructions are held to be
reversible error.7 Even in these jurisdictions, should the court in a particular
case deem the evidence insufficient to go to the jury, so that a non-suit or a
directed verdict might be ordered, the rule that positive testimony is of greater
weight than negative is applicable and is recognized by the court. In other jurisdictions, where the court may comment on the evidence, an instruction as to the
relative value of positive and negative testimony is held proper.8 There is
apparently unanimity in holding that the court may not instruct the jury where
there is a conflict of affirmative and quasi-negative testimony. In such case, it
is the province of the jury alone to weigh the testimony.
FRANCHISES-TAXATIoN-RIGHT OF RAILROAD TO CRoss NAVIGABLE STREAM
-The state of New York granted' to the Niagara Falls International Bridge
Company authority to construct a bridge across the Niagara River, and further,
to enter into a contract with a railroad company for the operation of trains on
the structure when completed. Pursuant to such authority, the upper floor of
the bridge was leased to the Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada. The
defendant tax commission assessed the railroad's privilege of crossing the
GI BLASHFELD, op. cit. supra note I, § 1i6.
6 1 BLASaF ELD, loc. cit. supra note 5.
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. v. Schneider, 40 Ind. App.
524, 82 N. E. 538 (io7) ; Chicago & Alton R. R. v. Louderback, 125 Ill. App.
323 (i9o6) ; Indiana, Illinois & Iowa R. R. Co. v. Otstot, 212 Ill. 429, 72 N. E.
387 (1904) ; Essex v. Kansas City, Fort Scott & Memphis R. R. Co., 7o Mo.
App. 634 (1897); Kansier v. City of Billings, 56 Mont. 250, 184 Pac. 63o
(ig19) ; Crabtree v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 86 Neb. 33, 124 N. W. 932 (igio). In
Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Hawke, 143 Atl. 27 (Del. 1928), the appellate
court affirmed the refusal of the lower court to instruct the jury as to the relative value of positive and negative testimony because of a constitutional provision which prohibited judges from charging juries as to matters of fact.
8
Holmes v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 74 N. J. L. 469, 66 At. 412 (1907).
In Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Moffatt, et al., 56 Kan. 667, 44 Pac. 6o7 (1896),
it was held to be the duty of the court upon request to call the attention *of the
jury to the relative value of positive and negative evidence. Like decisions are
found in Pennsylvania: Urias v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 152 Pa. 326, 25 Atl.
566 (1892) ; Hess v. Williamsport & North Branch R. R. Co., i8i Pa. 492, 37
AtI. 568 (1897) ; Winterbottom v. Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington R. R.
Co., 217 Pa. 574, 66 AtI. 864 (i9o7) ; and in Wisconsin: Hildman v. City of
Phillips, io6 Wis. 611, 82 N. W. 566 (i9oo).
Such an instruction has been
held discretionary by the court in Rhodes v. United States, supra note I; and in
Atlanta & West Point R. R. v. Newton, 85 Ga. 517, 11 S. E. 776 (i8go), although the Georgia courts may not charge on the weight of evidence, an instruction that "everything else being equal, positive testimony is to be believed rather
than negative" was approved.
'West Chicago Street R. R. Co. v. Mueller, siupra note 3; Gibson v. Bessemer & L. E. R. R. Co., supra note 4.
2N. Y. LAws 1853, c. 622.
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Niagara River, a navigable stream, as a ratable special franchise.' The railroad
contended that this privilege was derived from its lease with the bridge company
and hence not assessable as a public franchise. Held (three judges dissenting),
that the assessment is invalid. People ex rel. Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada v.
Gilchrist et al., 248 N. Y. 97, 161 N. E. 432 (1928).
The courts are in substantial unanimity in holding that a railroad has no
right to cross a public street or navigable river without the consent of the legislature' or its authorized agent.' In the absence of legislative consent, "not only
does the structure constitute a continuing trespass, but every person crossing the
river upon it would be a trespasser."' Moreover, such consent, when given the
carrier, constitutes a special privilege or franchise,' being a contract,7 entered
into by the state, and is taxable in the hands of the railroad as a valuable asset.'
This is established doctrine.' The majority of the court in the instant case,
while not attempting to gainsay any of the above principles, reason that the special privilege held by the railroad was derived from the owners of the bridge,
not from the state. As it had previously been held" that the franchise of the
bridge company was not taxable-not being within the express purview of the
Tax Law -- it is apparent that valuable privileges were thus being held by both
the bridge and the railroad company entirely free from taxation. Assuming
that the bridge company was properly held not to come within the provisions of
the taxing statute, it would seem, nevertheless, that the railroad is itself exercising a franchise, separate and distinct from that held by the bridge company."
That the grant is not by direct legislative enactment, but is made by the bridge
company acting under the authority of the legislature, should not affect the
result. 3 In either case the railroad can cross the river only by public authoriza'N. Y. LAws 1916, C. 323 §

2

sub. 6.

'State v. St. Louis, etc., Ry., 279 Mo. 616, 216 S. W. 763 (1gIg) ; People
ex rel. Harlem R. R. v. Tax Commissioners, 215 N. Y. 507, lO9 N. E. 569
(1915); People ex rel. N. Y. Central R. R. v. Tax Commissioners, 239 N. Y.
183, 146 N. E. 197 (924).
'State v. Portage City Water Co., 107 Wis. 441, 83 N. W. 697 (19oo);
Jovyc,8 FRANcHISES (19W9) § 148.
See opinion of Andrews, J., in principal case, at io6, 161 N. E. at 436.
a2 CooI.EY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 857.
7
.Trustees of Southampton v. Jessup, 162 N. Y. 122, 56 N. E. 538 (1895) ;
The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 51 (U. S. 1865); Helena Water Works v.
Helena, 195 U. S. 383,

25

Sup. Ct. 40 (1904) ; JoycE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 4;

Note (igi8) 86 CENT. L. J. 367.
'Gas Company v. Public Utility Commission, 87 N. J. L. 581, 92 Atl. 6o6
(1913); Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Los Angeles, 164 Cal. 156, 13o Pac. 174
(1912); I DxSTY, TAXATION (1884)
§ 361; Needham, Franchises (191o) I5

Co. L. REV. 97; Note (1909) 57 U. oF PA. L. REv. 315.
'2 CoolEY, op. cit. supra note 6, § 857; JoYc,
op. cit. supra note 4, § 8,
i DESTY, op. cit. supra note 8, § 361.

People ex rel. Niagara Falls International Bridge Co. v. State Tax Com-

mission, 1O3 Misc. 648, 17o N. Y. Supp. 997 (1918).
, Supra note 2.

'State v. St. Louis, etc. Ry., supra note 3; People ex. rel. N. Y. Central
R. R. v. Tax Commissioners, supra note 3.
nSupra note 4.
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tion,"' and this entirely apart from its authority, derived from the lease, to use
the bridge structure. The precedents on this point are few, however, and the
problem raised is an interesting and important one, not satisfactorily settled by
the reasoning of the majority opinion.
INSURANcE-FIDELITY BONDs-LABILITY UNDER RENEWAL CERTIFICATE--

The defendant company insured the plaintiff for one year against any loss up to
five thousand dollars occasioned by the dishonesty of an employee. At the end
of the year a renewal certificate was issued by which the bond was continued,
"provided, however, that the aggregate liability shall not exceed the greatest
amount for which the company shall have specifically guaranteed such employee
since the effective date of the bond." Plaintiff sues to recover for losses in
both years totaling over five thousand dollars. Held, that the provision in the
renewal certificate limited the company's liability under both the bond and renewal to a total of five thousand dollars. Mortgage Corp. v. Ins. Co., 221 N. W.

140 (Mich. 1928).
The extent of the liability of an insurance company under a bond and renewal
certificate has been held to depend upon whether or not the two instruments
constitute separate agreements.1 In some cases courts have regarded bonds and
renewals thereof as separate and distinct contracts, on each of which the insurer
was liable to the full amount set forth therein. In other cases the bonds and
renewals have been treated as one continuous contract under which the insurer
was liable only to the amount set forth in the bond! This double line of decisions has misled some authorities to the conclusion that there is a definite conflict among the jurisdictions on this subject. Such a belief is expressed by
reputable text writers,' and is reflected in the opinions of some courts
The
I'Supra note 3. See also People v. State Board, 69 Misc. I, 125 N. Y.
Supp. 895 (910) ; 4 MIcHIE, CARRIERS (915) 3555. In People v. State Board,
supra, the rule was held to apply to a railroad tunnel built under the river.
"Ladies v. Surety Co., 96 Mich. 27, 163 N. W. 7 (0912).
F Proctor Coal Co. v. U. S. Fidelity Co., 124 Fed. 424 (N. D. Ga. 1903);
Aetna Co. v. Commercial Bk., I3 F. (2d) 474 (E. D. Ill. 1926); Brunswick v.
Harvey, 114 Ga. 733, 40 S. E. 754 (19o2) ; De Jernette v. Fidelity Co., 98 Ky.
558, 33 S. W. 828 (1896) ; Ladies v. Surety Co., supra note i; U. S. Fidelity
Co. v. Williams, 96 Miss. i6, 49 So. 742 (i9o9); Bk. v. American Co., i94 Mo.

App. 224, 187 S. W. 99 (1916); Milk Co. v. Fidelity Co., i6i App. Div. 738,
146 N. Y. Supp. 92 (914); Green v. U. S. Fidelity Co., 135 Tenn. xi7, i85

S.W. 726 (I915).

"Bonding Co. v. Morrow, 8o Ark. 49, 96 S. W. 613 (igo6) ; Bk. v. Casualty

Co., 293 Fed. 783 (E. D. Ark. 1024); Church Co. v. Indemnity Co., 13 Ga.
App. 826, 8o S. E. 1093 (i9o9) ; Fidelity Co. v. Ice Co., 133 Ky. 74, 117 S. W.
393 (io)
; U. S. Co. v. Lodge, 163 Ky. 7o6, 174 S. W. 487 (1915) ; Rankin v.
U. S. Co., 86 Ohio St. 267, 99 N. E. 314 (1912) ; State v. New Amsterdam, no
OkIa. 23, 236 Pac. 603 (925); Bk. v. Fidelity Co., no Tenn. io, 75 S. W.
io76 (iqo2).
'WALER, FIDELrY BONDS (1909) 138; KER, INsURANcE (,902) 49.

1 See Proctor Coal Co. v. U. S. Fidelity Co., supra note 2. at 427; Ladies v.
Surety Co., supra note i, at 34, 63 N. W. at 9; Pearson v. U. S. Fidelity Co.,
138 Minn. 240, 244, 164 N. W. 919, 920 (917).
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dissenting justice in the principal case entertains this notion. But in reality
there is no such conflict. Each court has faced the problem of construing a
particular instrument. The primary question in each case has not been whether
a renewal certificate creates a new contract, but rather, what liability, as a
matter of fact, the parties intended to create.7 This question involves the construction of the entire instrument,' and occasions answers varying with the
tenor of the agreements.' That renewal certificates have been differently construed in this respect by courts of the same jurisdiction"0 is evidence that there
is no real conflict. The court in the principal case recognizes these principles.
It refuses to be controlled by former Michigan decisions treating the renewals
as separate contracts," but properly gives effect to the intentions of the parties
as revealed in the instrument, namely, to limit the liability of the defendant to
a single obligation.
INTERPLEADER-REQUIREMENT

OF

PRIviTy-A deposit had been made in a

bank in the name of "E. D. M. executrix." E. D. M. had been executrix of
J. M.'s estate. Upon her death, her executor claims the deposit as part of her
estate; the administrators de bonis non of J. M. claim it as part of J. M.'s
estate. Upon bill of interpleader being filed by bank, defendant executor contends that interpleader is improper because there is no privity between the
adverse claimants. Held, interpleader will lie. First Nat. Bank of Portlandv.
Reynolds et al., 143 At. 266 (Me. 1928).

The fundamental purpose of interpleader is to protect from the expense and
annoyance of multiple suits, the holder of a res which is claimed by two or more,
where the holder is interested only in turning over the res to the one entitled
to it. Thus it is essential that the validity of one claim depend upon the invalidity of the other, that is, that there be only one obligation; 1 where both claimants
may be right there is no reason why they should be united in one proceeding.
But besides this inherently essential requirement, others more technical have
been held to restrict the granting of the remedy 9 The most serious and per'At 141 he says: "The courts of the country are not in unison on the question of whether the renewal of a policy of insurance is a new contract or a continuance of the old one."
'See Aetna Co. v. Bk., supra note 2, at 476; U. S. Fidelity Co. v. Bk., 233
Ill. 475, 486, 84 N. E. 670, 674 (19o8); Maryland Co. v. Bk., 258 S. W. 584,
588 (Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1924).
'For rules of construction of -fidelity bonds, see Aetna Co. v. Bk., supra
note 2; Guaranty Co. v. Bk., 183 U. S. 402, 22 Sup. Ct. 124 (igoi) ; Employers
Liability Co. v. Bk., 151 N. E. 396 (Ind. 1926) ; Surety Co. v. Tyler, 30 Okla.
116, 12o Pac. 936 (1911); Green v. Fidelity Co., supra note 2; Whinfield v.
Bonding Co., 16i Wis. I, 154 N. W. 632 (1916).
See Green v. Fidelity Co., supra note 2, at 134, 185 S. W. at 730.
10 Compare the cases from Ga., Ky., and Tenn. respectively, supra note 2,
with those from the same states supra note 3.
'Brady v. N. W. Ins. Co., ii Mich. 425 (1863); Ladies v. Surety Co.,
supra note I.
1 Alton v. Merritt, 145 Minn. 426, 177 N. W. 770 (1920) ; Nat. Security v.
Batt, 215 Mass. 489, lO2 N. E. 691 (1913) ; Pratt v- Worrell, 66 N. J. Eq. 194,
57 Atl. 450 (1904).
2 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1919) § 1464 et seq.
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plexing of these is that of "privity,"-that the adverse claims "be connected, or
dependent, or one derived from the other, or both derived from a common
source."
A narrow interpretation of this requirement has led courts to deny
relief in situations similar to the one in the principal case, on the ground that
the claims are unconnected and independent.' Other courts, cognizant of the
arbitrary nature of the requirement, have sought to limit its unjust effects by
giving to privity a meaning broad enough to cover most situations. 5 Privity,
they say, exists when the claims are both derived from the same obligation, i.e.,
when the claimants agree that the res came rightfully into the hands of the
present holder, the applicant for relie. 0 To this liberal interpretation, the principal case lends the force of its decision,-since both the executor and the administrators claim through the bank's obligation, there is privity. This interpretation, nevertheless, fails to afford relief in some worthy cases. ' The test of
privity, therefore, has by statute been altogether -abolished in England and in
several of our states ;' in other states, it has by statute been abolished in favor
of sheriffs,9 certain kinds of banks, and certain bailees.Y Some courts seem
'lbid. § 1468; Crawshay v. Thornton, 2 Myl. & C. I (Eng. 1837) ; Bank v.
Skillings Lumber Co., 132 Mass. 410 (1882) ; Byers v. Commission Co., III Ill.
App. 58o (904).
'Runkle's Adm'r v. Runkle's Adm'r, 112 Va. 788, 72 S. E. 695 (19i) (one
claimed bank deposit was made for husband and wife jointly, the other that it
was made for wife alone) ; Insurance Co. v. Kidder, 162 Ind. 382, 70 N. E. 489
(1903) (one claimed proceeds of insurance policy as beneficiary, the other as
creditor of corporation in which insured had interest) ; Jax Co. v. Fla. Farms,
9r Fla. 593, 109 So. 212 (1926)

(creditor and assignee respectively of judgment

creditor claim of judgment debtor) ; Fogg v. Goode, 78 Fla. 138, 82 So. 614
(r919) (executor and surviving partner respectively of obligee claim of maker
of note). In the last case the court apologetically admits that what it is bound
by is a "highly technical requirement."
'Casualty Co. v. Fischmann, 99 N. J. Eq. 758, 134 Atl. 179 (1926) (judgment debtor v. creditor of judgment creditor and claimant of judgment in own
right) ; Phillips v. Taylor, 148 Md. 157, 129 Atl. I8 (1925) (vendee of lumber
v. vendor and claimant of half the proceeds of sale on ground of being cotenant
of land) ; Schmidt v. Pittsburgh Co., 256 Pa. 363, oo Atl. 959 (1917) (insurance co. v. beneficiary of policy and adm'r of insured) ; McGinn v. Bank, 178
Mo. App. 347, i66 S. W. 345 (1914) (bank v. indorsee of depositor's check and
one claiming
as principal of depositor).
8
1bid. See Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader (192) 30 YALE L. J. 814.
'Bank v. Thompson, 82 N. J. Eq. 11i,87 Atl. 636 (1913) (one claimed as
depositor of note for collection, the other as rightful owner of note) ; Bank v.
Skillings Lumber Co., supra note 3 (one claimed as executrix of depositor, the
other as owner of the money which it claimed had been wrongfully deposited) ;
Bank v. Bininger, 26 N. J.Eq. 345 (1875) ; (in suretyship transaction, one
claiming bonds as creditor of bailor, the other as owner, declaring they had been
deposited without her consent).
'See MACLENNAN, LAW OF INTERPLEADER (1901) 125 and appendix; also
Chafee, op. cit. suprq note 6, at 84o.
'See MACLENNAN, op. cit. supranote 8, appendix.
" MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 168, § 136 (savings banks) ;. Phillips v.
Suffolk Bank, 219 Mass. 597, 1O7 N. E. 401 (1914) ; I N. Y. ANN. CONS. LAWS
(2d ed. 1917) c. 2 § 199 (trust companies) ; Evans v. Guaranty Trust Co., 187
App. Div. 30, 175 N. Y. Supp. i18 (1919).
IUnder UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS ACT, § 17; and under UNIFORM
BILLS OF LADING ACT,§ 20.
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to have tacitly discarded the testy That the danger of multiple suits is not
lessened, nor the necessity for interpleader affected, by whether the claims be
connected or independent, is hardly disputable; thus the requirement of privity
remains as something utterly unreasonable and confusing.Y The principal case,
therefore, while it is to be commended upon reaching a just decision through the
adoption of the broad definition, nevertheless disappoints in its failure to disavow the .test altogether, particularly since the court reveals its recognition of
the undesirability of it.
PowERs-ExERcIsE oF PowER OF

APPOINTMENT RY

BENEFICIARY

OF

TRUST

BxmxcIARY'S ESTATEDeceased was the beneficiary of two trust funds to be paid at her death to
whomever she directed. By her will she exercised the power of appointment.
Her own estate being insufficient to pay her debts, her executor claims as much
of this property as is needed for that purpose. On a bill for instructions by the
trustee, held, that trust property subject to a power of appointment by the beneficiary of the trust is not subject to the debts of the beneficiary's estate. Rhode
Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Anthony et al.; Same v. Perkins et al., 142 Atl. 531
(R. I. 1928).
The rule established in England by a long line of decisions' and followed
generally throughout the United States' is that property over which a general
power of appointment has been exercised is thereby rendered an equitable asset
for the payment of the debts of the donee of the power, to be used, however,
only when the estate of the donee of the power is insufficient 3 When the power
is not exercised, the estate subject to the power is not liable for the debts of the
donee.' The principal case follows a number of decisions which have overPRoPERTY-LrATIIjTY OF PROPERTY FOR THE DEmTS OF

Boyle v. Manion, 74 Miss. 572, 21 So. 530 (1897) (vendee of lumber v.
vendor and one claiming to be owner of land) ; see Baber v. Houston, 218 S. W.
156 (Tex. igig).
" Writers seem to be unanimous in disapproving of the requirement. See
POMEROY, op. cit. supra note I, § 1468; 2 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (i4th
ed. 1918) § 1135; MACLENNAN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 122; Chafee, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 829.

'Ashfield v. Ashfield,

2

Vern. 287 (Eng. 1693); Thompson v. Town. 2

Vern. 319 (Eng. 1694) ; Lassels v. Cornwallis,

2

Vern. 465 (Eng. 1704) ; Hinton

v. Toye, I Atk. 465 (Eng. 1739) ; Townshend v. Windham, 2 Ves. Sr. 2 (Eng.
1750) ; Fleming v. Buchanan, 22 L. J. Ch. 886, 3 De G. -M. & G. 976 (1853);
O'Grady v. Wilmot, (i96) 2 A. C. 231, 85 L. J. Ch. N. S. 38.
2
Johnson v. Cushing, 15 N. H. 298 (1844); Rogers v. Hinton, 62 N. C. ioi
(1867) ; Knowles v. Dodge, I Mackey 66 (D. C. 1881) ; Freeman v. Bitters, 94
Va. 4o6, 26 S. E. 845 (1897) ; Security Trust Co. v. Ward, io Del. Ch. 409, 93
Atl. 385 (1915) ; Arnold v. Southern Pine Lumber Co., 58 Tex. Civ. App. 186,
S. W. 1162 (191o); Hill v. Treasurer, 229 Mass. 476, 118 N. E. 892, L. R.
A. I9i8D 337; Crane v. Fidelity Co., 99 N. J. Eq. 164, 133 Atl. 205 (1926);
I STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (I3th ed.) 176.
123

' Patterson v. Lawrence, 83 Ga. 703, IO S. E. 355 (1889) ; Walker v. Treasurer,
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Mass. 6oo, I09 N. E. 647 (1911).

"Gilman v. Bell, 99 IIl. 144 (1881) ; Duncanson v. Manson, 3 App. D. C.
260 (1894) ; Holmes v. Coghill, 12 Ves. Jr. 296 (Eng. 18o6).
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thrown the rule,' on the ground that neither the existence nor the exercise of
the power vests any estate in the property subject thereto in the donee of the
power,' and to render such property liable to the debts of the donee is a manifest
frustration of the intention of the donor,' from whom the appointees of the
donee alone derive title.8 The rule had its origin in the refusal of the court of
equity to allow a person to defraud his creditors by settling his property in
trust, reserving to himself a general power of appointment. But the substantial
equity upon which the rule originally rested has been lost sight of in later cases
which have extended its scope to cover situations in which the donee appoints to
V
property he never owned.
' The definition of a general power has been likewise
extended. Originally a power was not general unless the donee of the power
could exercise it during his life for his own benefit,' but the modern cases hold
that, so long as the donee can appoint to anyone he pleases, it is immaterial that
he cannot appoint to his own use or the use of anyone to take effect in his lifetime.' Thus the court of equity by an arbitrary rule, based only on the proposition that it is unjust that property which the donee could have appointed to
his creditors should go to volunteers, defeats the intention of the donor and
renders it impossible for him to leave his property to be disposed of at the discretion of another without subjecting it to the payment of the other's debts.
'Commonwealth v. Duffield,

12

Pa. 277 (1849) ; Terppe's Estate,
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Pa.

482, 73 Atl. 922 (igog) ; Wales v. Bowdish, 61 Vt. 23, 17 At. 1000, 4 L. R. A.

8ig (1889); Prince de Beam v. Winans, I Md. 434, 74 Atl. 626 (igOg);
Adger v.Kirke, 1I6 S.C. 298, io8 S. E. 97 (i92o).
'Burleigh v. Clough, 52 N. H. 26 (1872) ; Osgood v. Bliss, 141 Mass. 474,
6 N. E. 527 (i885) ; Keays v. Blum, 234 Ill.
121, 84 N. E. 628, 14 ANN. CAS. 37
(i9o8); Roach v. Wadham, 6 East 289 (Eng. 1805); In re Devons Settled
Estates, L. R. (1896) 2 Ch. 562.
7
"Why, when the party executes a power in favor of others and not of
himself, a court of equity should defeat his intention, though within the scope of
the power, and should execute something beside the intention and contrary to it,
is not very intelligible." I STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, (13th ed.) 176 note
3, in which the rule is vigorously criticised.
'That the appointees take by virtue of the original grant is held even by
those courts which uphold the rule. Sewall v. Wilmer, 132 Mass. 131 (1882) ;
Re Harbeck, I6I N. Y. 2TI, 55 N. E. 85o (1899); Hill v. Treasurer, supra note
2; In re Murphy, 182 Cal. 74o, I90 Pac. 46 (I2o); Roach v. Wadham, supra
note 6; Platt v. Routh, 3 BeaV. 257 (Eng. 1840), io L. J.Ch. N. S. II, aff'd
io Clark & F. 257 (Eng. 1843) ; O'Grady v. Wilmot, supra note 2. As a consequence it is uniformly held that in the absence of a statute, property appointed
by the will of the donee of a power is not subject to an inheritance tax levied on
"property in which the decedent has an interest." U. S. v. Field, 255 U. S. 257,
41 Sup. Ct. 256, I8 A. L. R. 146 (1921) ; Re Stewart, 131 N. Y. 274, 3o N. E.
184 (1892) ; State v. U. S. Trust Co., 99 Kan. 84i, 163 Pac. 156 (1917) ; In re
Murphy,
supra.
9
Ashfield v. Ashfield; Thompson v. Town; Lassels v. Cornwallis, all supra
note I.
" Johnson v. Cushing, supra note 2; Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. 200
(1879) ; Security Trust Co. v. Ward, supra note 2; O'Grady v. Wilmot, supra
note I.
' Townshend v. Windham, supra note I; Bristow v. Warde, 2 Ves. Jr. 336
(Eng. 1794) ; JEREy, EQUITY JURIsDICrION (1828) 377.
'Johnson v. Cushing, supra note 2; Leigh v. Smith, 38 N. C. 442 (I844);
Clapp v. Ingraham, supra note 10; 2 FARwmiC, PowEns (2d ed. 1893) 7.

424

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

The rule is too firmly imbedded in the law of England to allow any hope of
change. In the United States, however, the holding of the principal case, that
the rule is logically untenable unless there has been actual fraud on creditors, is
gaining ground."
SALES-TRANSFER OF TITLE-RETENTION

OF POSSESSION BY SFLLER-The

defendant agreed to sell its output of paper to the plaintiff, who should pay for
it as produced, the paper to be stored for the plaintiff and subsequently cut,
packed and shipped as ordered by the plaintiff. At the time of the defendant's
insolvency, the paper, so stored, was insured in the plaintiff's name, and the latter
had reimbursed the defendant for the insurance. The plaintiff, having paid for
the paper, petitions its delivery. Held, that the creditors of the defendant, and
not the plaintiff, are entitled to the paper. Shipler v. New Castle Paper Prodncts Corp., 143 Atl. 182 (Pa. 1928).
The court holds that title to the paper did not pass to the plaintiff because
the defendant did not put the paper into the agreed deliverable state. Although,
under the Sales Act, the paper should be considered future goods at the time of
the contract,' and title could not then pass to the vendee,' yet prior to this suit
by the plaintiff the paper had become specific, and the intention of the parties
should have governed the time of passage of title.' At common law and under
the Sales Act, the title to goods non-specific at the time of the contract does not
pass until, having been specified, they are appropriated to the contract with the
assent of both parties.' When the vendor agrees to ship the goods to the vendee,
the presumption, in the absence of a clear expression of intention, is that sufficient appropriation and assent are not present until the goods have been delivered
to a common carrier5 But if an intention to pass title before such delivery is
"See cases cited in note 5 supra.
SALES AcT, § 5 (1): "The goods which form the subject matter of a contract to sell may be either existing goods, owned or possessed by the seller, or
goods to be manufactured or acquired by the seller after the making of the contract to sell, in this act called 'future goods'." Section 76: "'Future goods'
means goods to be manufactured or acquired by the seller after the making of
the contract of sale."
'Aldridge v. Johnson, 26 L. J. Q. B. 296 (1857); SATES AcT, § 17; Wilson
v. Empire Salt Co., 50 App. Div. 114, 63 N. Y. Supp. 565 (i9oo) ; see American
Hide Co. v. Chalkley Co., ioi Va. 458, 464, 44 S. E. 705, 707 (903).
'SALES AcT, § 18; McEntire v. Crossley Bros., [1895] A. C. 457; Hammer
v. United States, 249 Fed. 336 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918) ; Perkins v. Halpren, 257 Pa.
402, IOI AtI. 741 (917);

Hoeffler v. Carew, 135 Wis. 605, 116 N. W. 241

(1908).
'Mitchell v. Le Clair, I65 Mass. 308, 43 N. E. 117 (1896) ; SALES Acr, § I9,
rule 4 (I) ; Bundy v. Meyer, 148 Minn. 252, 181 N. W. 343 (I92i) ; Frank Pure
Food Co. v. Dodson, 281 Pa. 125, 126 Atl. 243 (1924). The "Potential Existence Doctrine" is an exception to this rule. Grantham v. Hawley, Hob. 132
(16x6); Petch v. Tutin, 15 M. & W. 110 (1846); Arques v. Wasson, 5I Cal.
620 (1877); Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N. Y. 570, 37 N. E. 632
(894).

5
Johnson v. L. & Y. Ry. Co., 3 C. P. D. 499 (1878); Hill v. Fruita Mercantile Co., 42 Colo. 491, 94 Pac. 354 (I9O8) ; and under § ig, rule 4 (2), of
the SALES AcT: Columbia Mills v. Machenbach Imp. Co., 117 Misc. 283, 191

RECENT CASES
clear, the title to the goods will pass to the vendee according to that intention 8
It seems the court in the instant case failed to recognize such an intention to
transfer title to the plaintiff when the paper was stored for him and insured in
his name. Other jurisdictions have held that storage of goods for the vendee
by the vendor shows an intention to pass title, which is effective to transfer
property in the goods as soon as the act is completed.7 Insurance of the goods
in the name of the vendee has always been held to be strong evidence of a similar intention
In the principal case the plaintiff's assent to the appropriation by
the defendant may be found in the former's payment to the latter for the insurance.' The intent of the defendant to appropriate the goods is found in the
agreement that the goods are to remain in storage until orders are received from
the plaintiff. Although the court erroneously found that the defendant held the
title to the paper, the legal rights of the plaintiff therein were not prejudiced
because of the Pennsylvania rule, that retention of goods by the vendor constitutes such fraud per se against his creditors as will void any transfer of title to
the vendee'
But only a few states adhere to this rule." The majority follow
N. Y. Supp. 325 (1921) ; see Pittsburgh P. & P. Co. v. Cudahy P. Co., 26o Pa.
135, 139, 103 At. 548, 549 (i918). The reason for postponing the passage of
title to this point, even when apparently appropriation has been previously
effected, may be found in I WILUsToN, SALES, § 278: "The true answer seems
rather to be this, that where several things are to be done by the seller to the
goods, it is to be assumed that the parties intend the appropriation to be deferred
until the last of these acts has been done."
'Aldridge v. Johnson, supra note 2; Floodwood Mercantile Co. v. Magil,
152

Minn. 554, i88 N. W. 734

(1922).

"Tuttle v. Miller, io7 Kan. 287, 192 Pac. 737 (1920) ; Bristol Co. v. Arkwright Mills, 213 Mass. 172, ioo N. E. 55 (1912). But cf. Amer. Metal Co. v.
Daugherty, 204 Mo. 71, 102 S. W. 538 (907).
8 Tuttle v. Miller; Bristol Co. v. Arkwright Mills, both supra note 7.
Ordinarily, when the vendor agrees to deliver the goods to a particular place or to
pay for the transportation of the goods to a particular place, title to the goods is
presumed to pass only upon the delivery of the goods to that place. SALES ACT,
§ ig, rule 5. But in C. I. F. contracts, the provision for insurance for the
vendee is held to show an intention to pass title to the goods when they are
delivered to the common carrier for transportation. Harper v. Hochstein, 278
Fed. IO2 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921) ; Smith Co. v. Moscahlades, 193 App. Div. 126, 183
N. Y. Supp. I5I (i92o); Smith Co. v. Marano, 267 Pa. io7, IIO At. 94 (192o).
8 SALES AcT, § i9, rule 4 (I):
"Such assent [to an act of appropriation]
may be expressed or implied, and may be given either before or after the appropriation is made."
"Clow v. Woods, 5 S. & R- 275 (Pa. 18ig) ; see Wendel v. Smith, 291 Pa.
247, 249, 139 Atl. 873, 874 (1927). But cf. Rucker v. Smith, 269 Pa. 451, 112
Atl. 540 (1921). A delivery of goods to a warehouse might sometimes be considered sufficient transfer of possession to the vendee to validate the passage of
title to the vendee even against the claims of the vendor's creditors. But, as
any effective delivery of possession must give notice to third parties of the
change of title, the court in the instant case was correct in holding the transfer
of property to the plaintiff void, for the defendant retained the key to the warehouse and had sole entry to the paper therein. Such delivery could scarcely give
the requisite notice.
I Ky. STAT. (Carroll, J922), § I9O8; Botcher v. Berry, 6 Mont. 448, 13
Pac. 45 (1887); Doucet v. Richardson, 67 N. H. 186, 29 Atl. 635 (1892);
Swartzburg v. Dickerson, 12 Okla. 566, 73 Pac. 282 (i9o3) ; Scott v. Hantz, 35
S. D. 634, i53 N. W. 894 (1915).
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the English rule that such retention is only prima facie proof of fraud.' A
=
third view holds that it is merely evidence from which the jury may find fraud.
In most states,
The Sales Act leaves the various rules of the states unchanged'
then, the vendee's title to goods retained by the vendor will prevail against the
claims of the latter's creditors upon proof that the transfer of title was bona
fide in fact. In such jurisdictions, erroneous reasoning concerning the passage
of title, like that in the instant case, might well deprive the vendee of his legal
right to the goods.
TAXATION-LEGISLATIVE

CONSTITUTIONAL

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SUBJECTS OF TAXATION-

REQUIREMENTS

OF UNIFORMITY

AND

EQUAL

PROTECTION-

Action is brought to recover taxes paid defendant, collector of revenue, under a
statute requiring payment of a license tax by owners of "branch and chain
stores," defined as "six or more stores or mercantile establishments, all under
the same management, supervision or ownership," the tax to be levied on each
of such series of six or more. Held, that the statute is void, for by such arbitrary, unjust and unreasonable classification, it violates the provision of the
state constitution requiring uniformity of taxation, and the equal protection
clause of the Federal Constitution. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Doughton, Commissioner of Revenue of North Carolina,144 S. E. 701 (N. C. 1928).
In addition to the assurance of equal protection afforded by the Federal
1
Constitution, there is, in the constitutions of almost all the states, a provision
requiring that taxes be uniform upon all the members of the same class.' The
power of a legislature to classify the subjects of taxation, however, is generally
recognized, and is subject only to the limitation that the classification shall be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and rest on some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation so that all persons simi3
A court deciding upon whether a
larly circumstanced shall be treated alike
'Martindale v. Booth, 3 B. & Ad. 498 (Eng. 1832) ; Alton v. Harrison,
L. R. 4 Ch. App. 621 (1869) ; Teague, Barnett & Co. v. Bass, 131 Ala. 422, 31
So. 4 (igoi) ; Smith v. Jones, 63 Ark. 232, 37 S. W. 1052 (1896) ; Briggs v.
Weston, 36 Fla. 629, 18 So. 852 (1895); Higgins v. Spahr, 145 Ind. 167, 43
N. E. ii (1896); Clark v. Lee, 78 Mich. 221, 44 N. W. 260 (1889); Leqve v.
Smith, 63 Minn. 24, 65 N. W. 121 (1895) ; see Holley v. Haile Motor Co., 188
N. Y. App. Div. 798, 810, 177 N. Y. Supp. 429, 437 (1919).
" Ingalls v. Herrick, io8 Mass. 351 (1871) ; see Harris v. Chaffee, 17 R. I.
193, 194, 21 Atl. 104, 1O5 (189o).
" SALES ACT, § 26: "Where a person having sold goods continues in possession of the goods, . . . and such retention of possession is fraudulent in
fact or is deemed fraudulent under any rule of law, a creditor or creditors of the
seller may treat the sale as void."
1

U. S. CONSTITUTION, Amend. 14.
'STIMsoN, Am. STAT. LAW (1886)
1924)
3

§ 252.

85, 86; COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed.
Connecticut, New York and South Dakota are the exceptions.

F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Va., 253 U. S. 412, 40 Sup. Ct. 56o (1919):
ed. 1897) 391-395; CoOLEY, TAXATION (4th
ed. 1924) §§ 259, 269. That the legislature may classify only subject to this
limitation is specifically provided in the state constitutional provisions as to uniformity, but would hold even in the absence of such provision, under the more
general clause of the Federal Constitution for equal protection, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court of the United States.
BLACK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d

RECENT CASES
given classification is proper or discriminates unjustly against a class, faces a
difficult problem, for no rule has been formulated such as would automatically
solve the question in a specific case.' Courts have permitted discrimination as
between one business and another,' but declare unconstitutional any statute subclassifying a given business on the basis, for example, of the device used in
carrying on the business, provided the device is in itself lawful and fair. On
the other hand, courts have recognized sub-classification based on other equally
subtle grounds: on the use and purpose for which property in a given business
is held," as in the case of wholesalers as distinguished from retailers; and on
the mode of sale, as in the case of those dealing at exchanges and those dealing
at boards of trade.' Discrimination against corporations, as opposed to natural
persons, has been held to be reasonable and based on a substantial difference.
The same economic progress and development which has produced the above
distinct groups, recognized by judicial as well as by legislative bodies, has more
recently given rise to the new group of branch and chain stores. These are
generally defined as "two or more retail stores dealing in the same line of goods
and under the same general management.""0 Admitting that the statute passed
upon in the principal case is arbitrary in its definition of this type of store, it is
an interesting question whether chain stores, more accurately defined" so as to
be clearly aimed at, as such, by a taxing law, will be admitted by the courts to
be so substantially different from independent retail stores as to justify discrimination, as has happened in the somewhat analogous case of corporations.
ToRTs-CoNTRIBUTORy NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAw-The plaintiff, a
pedestrian, having a clear view of the street, and having seen the defendant's
automobile approaching, stepped off the curb and proceeded across the intersection without further looking. When but a few steps from the curb, he was
struck by the automobile and injured. Held, that he was guilty of contributory
'Ayars' Appeal, 122 Pa. 266, 281, 16 At. 356, 363 (1889) comes nearest to a
definition of requirements for classification: ". . . classification . . . is
essentially unconstitutional, unless a necessity therefore exists, a necessity springing from manifest peculiarities, clearly distinguishing those of one class from
each of the other classes."
5
Gafill v. Bracken, 195 Ind. 551, 145 N. E. 312 (1924) ; (i926) I IND. L.
REv. 53.
' Seattle v. Dencher, 58 Wash. 5oi, io8 Pac. io86 (1g9o) (use of automatic
device in sale of cigars) ; It re Yot Sang, 75 Fed. 983 (i896) (laundries using
steam) ; Covington v. Dalheim, 126 Ky. 26, 1o2 S. W. 829 (i9o7) (grocers
using delivery wagons).
'Commonwealth v. Clark, 195 Pa. 634, 46 Atl. 286 (I900).
'Knisely v. Cotterel, 196 Pa. 614, 46 At. 86I (I9OO).
'Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., 22o U. S. I07, 145, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 353 (910).
"The thing taxed is not the mere dealing in merchandise, in which the actual
transactions may be the same, whether conducted by individuals or corporations,
but the tax is laid upon the privileges which exist in conducting business with
the advantages which inhere in the corporate capacity of those taxed and are
not enjoyed by private firms and individuals." E. Isaacs, Business and Property Taxes (1926) 36 YAI L. J. 195, 201. Contra: Quaker City Cab Co. v.
Saunders, 48 Sup. Ct. 553 (I928) (strong dissenting opinion).
1
0W. S. HAYwARD & P. WHITE, CHAIN STORES (Ist ed. x922) I.
nIbid.
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negligence as a matter of law, and could not recover. Meade v. Saunders, 144
S. E. 7II (Va. 1928).
The test advanced by courts ' and writers ' is that if men of ordinary intelligence would differ as to whether the plaintiff used due care the question of
contributory negligence is one of fact for the jury to determine, and conversely,
if such men would not differ, it is one of law for the court to decide. As most
accident cases present grounds for difference of opinion, the majority of the
courts leave the question of contributory negligence to be determined by the
jury.' But to offset the propensity of juries to award damages wherever there
is an injury,' there has been a tendency on the part of some courts to apply the
above rule to certain factual situations in such a way that they can decide arbitrarily that contributory negligence is present. Accordingly, they have held it
contributory negligence as a matter of law: for a driver to allow his machine
to proceed at such speed that it cannot be stopped within the radius of its lights;'
for a guest in an automobile to fail to warn the driver against excessive speed'
or of an approaching peril ; for a vehicle to proceed across a railroad crossing
without the driver stopping, looking and listening;' and for a pedestrian to

'Faucett v. Bergman, 22 F. (2d) 718, 720 (1927); Dowling v. Merchant's
Nat. Bank, 192 Iowa 1250, 1254, 184 N. W. 722, 725 (1921).
2 (1919) 53 Am. L. REV. 793.
'McKeen v. Iverson, 47 N. D. 132, I8o N. W. 8o5 (1921); Clark v. Traver,
205 App. Div. 206, aff'd in 237 N. Y. 544, 143 N. E. 736 (1923) ; Murphey v.
Hawthorne, 117 Ore. .319, 244 Pac. 79 (1926).
'Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact (I924) 72 U. oF PA. L. Ray.
III, 118, reprinted in BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF To Ts (1926) 6oi, 6o9.
IKelly v. Knobb, 300 Fed. 256 (S. D. Fla. 1924) ; Holsaple v. Menominee,
232 Mich. 603, 206 N. W. 529 (1925); Serfas v. Lehigh & N. E. Ry., 270 Pa.
306, 113 Atl. 370 (1921).
Contra: Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Ship, 174 Ark.
130, 297 S. W. 56 (1927), commented upon in (1928) 6 TEx. L. REv. 397;
Spiker v. Ottumwa, 193 Iowa 844, 186 N. W. 465 (1922). But cf. Claar Transfer Co. v. Omwake & C. B. Ry. Co., 191 Iowa 124, 181 N. W. 955 (1921).
'Sharp v. Sproat, III Kan. 735, 2o8 Pac. 613 (1922) (held a question of
fact merely as to whether plaintiff had sufficient time in which to protest);
Joyce v. Brockett, 237 N. Y. 561, 143 N. E. 743 (1923). Contra: Curran v.
Anthony, 77 Cal. App. 462, 247 Pac. 236 (1926); Codner v. Stowe, 2O Iowa
8oo, 208 N. W. 330 (1926). Likewise it was held contributory negligence as a
matter of law to ride with a known drunken driver. Schwartz v. Johnson, 152
Tenn. 586, 280 S. W. 32 (1926) ; Royson v. Ranier Taxi Co., 136 Wash. 274,
239 Pac. 559 (1925).
Oppenheim v. Barkin, 159 N. E. 628 (Mass. 1928) (guest fell asleep in
car), commented upon in (1928) 12 MINN. L. REV. 752. Contra: Bushnell v.
Bushnell, lO3 Conn. 583, 131 At. 432 (1925).
8
Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66, 48 Sup. Ct. 24 (1927).
This case has received wide comment: (1927) 76 U. OF PA. L. REV. 321; (1928)
28 CoL. L. REV. 250; (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 532; (1928) 16 CAL. L. REV. 238.
Razzis v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co., 273 Pa. 550, 117 Atl. 204 (1922).
Likewise it has been held contributory negligence as a matter of law to cross the
tracks without looking and listening. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. Sherman, 247 Fed. 269 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917). Contra: Watts v. Wabash Ry., 219 Ill.
App. 549 (192o) ; Sullivan v. Boston & Me. R. R., 242 Mass. 188, 136 N. E. 373
(1922).
On the question of the duty of a vehicle at a railroad crossing see
BERRY, AUTOMOBILES (5th ed. 1926) § 795; Note (1923) 71 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 153.
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cross the street without looking,' or after looking and seeing an approaching
car,"0 as in the principal case. It is interesting to note that this tendency of the
courts to rule as a matter of law in situations of fact in regard to which ordinary men might differ, is restricted to cases of contributory negligence," and is
not applied to the defendant's negligence. It seems that judges who, by reason
of their long experience on the bench, are familiar with the multifarious situations in accident cases, are more competent to fairly and correctly decide these
cases than the jury, a group of unversed individuals." But to do so the court
must set standards of conduct, and thus encroach on that which, by historical

development, is the peculiar province of the jury in tort law." It seems that the
greatest danger in this tendency is the rigidity which usually follows any rule
laid down by the courts.1 '

This raises the question whether the courts will con-

sider themselves bound by precedent in subsequent factual situations, or will be
content to merely set a standard of conduct in the particular case before them,
as the jury would do."
9
Doble v. United R. R. Co., 142 Atl. io6 (Md. 1928) ; Swetzoff v. O'Brien,
226 Mass. 438, 115 N. E. 748 (1917); Weaver v. Pickering, 279 Pa. 214, 123
At. 777 (1924).
"Meyers v. Cassity, 209 Ky. 315, 272 S. W. 718 (1925) (rev'd to try case
on last clear chance doctrine) ; Martin Baking Co. v. Tomkinson, 161 N. E. 288
(Ohio 1927).
" Especially in cases where the defendant is a large corporation, and the
jury is thus apt to be prejudiced, the court will so rule. Flick v. Northampton &
Bath R. R. Co., 274 Pa. 347, Ix8 Atl. 250 (1922), and railroad cases cited supra
note 8.
" HoLMES, THE CommoN LAW (I88I) 124.
"At early common law the jury was given the function not only of determining the facts of the case, but also of deciding whether the parties exercised
the care of "reasonable" men, thus determining the question of negligence. Mr.
Bohlen says, "The reasons why the functions of fixing definite standards is in
theory to be exercised by the jury . . . are in part historical, in part express
the public's desire to have its conduct judged by the layman ('man in the street')
rather than by the more sophisticated and expert judgment of the trained lawyer,
whose judicial experience may have given him a biased viewpoint." (1924) 72
U. oF PA. L. REv. at II6, STUDIES IN THE LAw or ToRTs, supra note 4, at 6o6.
"4 BOHLEN, (1924) 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. at 120, STUDIES iN THE LAW OF
TORTS, supra note 4, at 61o, "The practise has two great dangers. The first is
that of undue rigidity which results from the unfortunate feeling that any decision of the courts creates a rule of law, which as law, is absolutely and eternally
valid. . . . The second danger is that . . . the court must by its decisions
fix standards of conduct so definite and precise as to give unscrupulous practitioners extraordinary opportunities for successful coaching of their witnesses."
He classifies the setting of a standard of conduct as an "administrative" function, which whether by court or jury, should be used only in the instant case.
"The Pennsylvania cases have strictly adhered to the "stop, look, ane
listen" rule. Serfas v. Lehigh & N. E. Ry. Co., supra note 5; BEaaY, AuTomoBILS, supra note 8; Note U. OF PA. L. REv. supra note 8, at 156. Likewise in
Ohio, where Martin Baking Co. v. Tomkinson, supra note 1o, follows MacDiarmid Candy Co. v. Schwartz, ii Ohio App. 3o3 (1921). Due to the recency
of most of the other decisions it is hard to conjecture just what course the
courts will take.
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TRUSTS-LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY TRUSTEE OF PROCEEDS OF ITS OWN
POLIcIEs-ATTAcx

ON VALIDITY

OF

POLICIES

AS

GROUND

FOR REMOVAL

OF

TRUSTEE-An insurance company issuing certain life insurance policies was
made beneficiary of the policies as trustee of the proceeds for the benefit of the
wife and children of the insured. Later it sued to cancel the policies on the
ground of fraud, naming the insured and the cestuis que trustent as defendants,
the former dying after the suit was begun. The position of the insurance company as plaintiff in the suit being antagonistic to its duties as trustee to defend
such a suit, the defendants moved that the court remove the insurance company
as trustee and appoint a third party in its place to defend-the suit. Held, that
such a motion would be granted. New York Life Ins. Co. v. O'Brien, 27 F.
(2d) 773 (W. D. Mich. 1927).
The power of a court of equity to remove a trustee for cause is generally
acknowledged.' This power is exercised if a trustee refuses to act after having
2
once accepted the office, or if he makes an unreasonable claim against the trust
property,' or if he is antagonized by litigation,' or acts adversely to the interest
5
of the cestuis. Proceedings for removal are generally commenced directly, but
when a bill or petition is already pending for the administration of the trust, the
In the instant case, the
removal may be made on motion in these proceedings
motion was made in a suit attacking the validity of the trust and not in a bill for
administration, yet the court, recognizing that equity places expediency above
formality, properly granted the motion, despite the fact that a local statute
required removal by petition or bill. The contention that there was no trust
until the funds from the policies were actually received, and that the insurance
company was therefore not violating any trust duty by suing to cancel the policies, is not supportable. A trust is none the less complete because the time for
the actual enjoyment of the property is deferred until after the settlor's death.'
The novel factual situation here presented of a trustee attacking the validity of
'May v. May, 167 U. S. 310, 17 Sup. Ct. 824 (1897) ; People v. Norton, 9
N. Y. 176 (1853); Letterstedt v. Broers, 9 App. Cas. 371 (1884); PERRY,
TRUSTS (6th ed. 1911) § 280. In Pennsylvania, the court of common pleas has
power to dismiss a trustee at any time, even before he has entered on his duties,
upon good cause being shown by the cestut. Piper's Appeal, 2o Pa. 67 (1852) ;
see also ACT OF JUNE 16, 1836, P. L. 784 § 13, PA. STAT. (West, 192o) § 4562;
ACT OF MAY I, 1861, P. L. 68o § I, PA. STAT. (West, 192o) § 21286. THE
FIDUcIARiES AT OF JUNE 7, 1917, P. L. 447 § 63, PA. STAT. (West, 1920)
§ 8397 limits jurisdiction for removal of testamentary trustees to the orphans'
court.
aIrvine v. Dunham, III U. S. 327, 4 Sup. Ct. 501 (1884) ; Wood v. Stane,
8 Price 613 (Eng. 1820).
'Cooper v. Day, I Rich. Eq. 26 (S. C. 1844).
'Davidson v. Moore, 14 S. C. 251 (188o).
'Barbour v. Weld, 201 Mass. 513, 87 N. E. 909 (19o9) ; Matter of Hirsch,
116 App. Div. 367, ioi N. Y. Supp. 893 (19o6); Dickerson v. Smith, 17 S. C.
289 (I881).

0Jones v. Jones, 8 Misc. 66o, 30 N. Y. Supp. 177 (894) ; Ex parte Potts,
I Ashm. 340 (Pa. 1831) ; PERRY, loc. cit. supra note I.
7cMICH. CoMP. LAWS (Cahill, 1915) § 11590.
8 Egerton v. Carr, 94 N. C. 648 (i886); Allen v. Hendrick, IO4 Ore. 202,
2o6 Pac. 733 (1922).
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the trust which it is its duty to defend is the result of a debtor being made trustee of its own debt. Many cases which have declared a debtor to have become
trustee of his own debt have been validly criticised when no specific res has been
set aside to be the subject of tfie trust.9 This objection cannot be made in the
instant case, as the policy, which was evidence of the debt, was the res specifically designated. However, the very fact that the interests of the debtor and
the trustee (who are identical) may clash and require the drastic remedy here
applied is a cogent practical argument against making debtors trustees of their
own debts. In view of this objection, it is suggested to those who follow the
popular practice of leaving the proceeds of insurance policies in trust for the
beneficiaries, that a responsible third party be appointed as trustee rather than
the insurance company which issues the policies.
' It has never been doubted that an essential element of every trust is the
specific res which is the subject of the trust. Yet courts seem to have overlooked this essential in some cases. A creditor who instructed his debtor to pay
all or part of the debt to a third party instead of to the creditor has been held
to have made the debtor trustee of his own debt for the benefit of the third party,
even though no specific fund was set aside in the assets of the debtor as the
subject of the trust. Eaton v. Cook, 25 N. J. Eq. 55 (1874); McFadden v.
Jenkins, i Phillips 153 (Eng. 1842); Paterson v. Murphy, ii Hare 88 (Eng.
1853) (where the court curiously said there was an existing fund which consisted of the debt due the creditor); Gosling v. Gosling, 3 Drew. 335 (Eng.
1855) (also sustained on the ground of survivorship) ; Roberts v. Roberts, 12
Jur. (N. S.) 97I (1866) ; Parker v. Stones, 38 L. J. Ch. 46 (1869).
Some of these decisions have been criticised by text writers. Ames, NovaLion (1892) 6 HAnv. L. REv. 189; AES, CASES ON TRUSTS (1893) 48 n. i.
Although the liability of the debtor to the third party is sustainable because in
fact either a novation or a third party beneficiary contract has been created, the
misnomer of trust cannot be justified, but it may be explained. It is the result
of a tendency, when trust law was developing, to throw everything uncertain into
the trust category. In some of the cases the trust theory has been distorted in
order to allow a third party beneficiary to recover in a jurisdiction where third
party beneficiary contracts are not generally recognized. The better view is that,
in order that a valid trust exist in such cases, a specific fund must be set aside
in the assets of the debtor: Rice v. U. S., 2r Ct. Claims 413 (1886) ; Marble v.
Marble, 304 Ill. 229, 136 N. E. 589 (1922); Hickock v. Bunting, 67 App. Div.
56o, 73 N. Y. Supp. 967 (19o2) (gratuitous debtor creating trust for benefit of
friend who has incurred loss through her) ; see also Samuels v. Drew, 296 Fed.
882 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924) ; or that the evidence of the debt be turned over to the
debtor: Evans's Estate, 6 Pa. C. C. 437 (1888) semble; In re Caplen's Estate,
45 L. J. Ch. 280 (1876).

